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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding, in

effect, that the Utah Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of the
proceedings when Respondent did not provide Appellant with a
timely notice of appeal, in violation of Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure?
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding, in

effect, that the brief filed by Respondent on March 1 was timely
and should not be stricken, and that her appeal should not be
dismissed, where the brief was not filed timely in light of the
fact

that

the

Court

of Appeals

denied

Respondent's

second

request for an extension of time?
3.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding, in

effect, that the Utah Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to
consider the trial court's denial of Respondent's Rule 60(b)
motion

to

set

aside

the

order

against

Respondent,

where

Respondent failed to appeal such order?
4.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding, in

effect, that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Appellant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit brought by Respondent,
where, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court
was justified in dismissing this suit?
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Gee v,

Zuehlke, Slip Opinion, Case No. 890718-CA

(dated November 21, 1990).

See Appendix A.
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JURISDICTION
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to allow
the Utah Supreme Court to review the Utah Court of Appeals'
reversal,

entered

November

21, 1990, of

an order

granting

Appellant's motion to dismiss, such order being granted by
Honorable Richard Moffat of the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) of the Utah Code.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1987).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for
special and important reasons.

The following, while neither

controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered

a

decision

in

conflict

with

a

decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
—

has decided a question of state or federal
law in a way that is in conflict with a
decision of the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered

a

decision

that

has

so

far

departed from the accepted and usual course
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of

judicial

proceedings

or

has

so

far

sanctioned such a departure by a lower court
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or
federal which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.
Utah R. App. P. 46.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is a personal

injury action based upon a

traffic accident which occurred on or about June 23, 1984.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition
Below and Statement of Facts.

Because the relevant facts in this particular appeal
concern the course of proceedings and disposition below, these
two sections will be combined into one section for the purposes
of this appeal.
On or about July 15, 1985, Plaintiff/Respondent
Nancy Gee (hereinafter "Respondent Gee") filed a complaint in
the Third Judicial District Court against Defendant/Appellant
Angela

M.

June 27,

Zuehlke

1989,

the

(hereinafter

"Appellant

Zuehlke").

trial

entered

order

court

an

On

requiring

Respondent Gee to submit to an independent medical examination
scheduled for June 29, 1989.

Respondent Gee unreasonably and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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knowingly refused
examiner

in

the

to cooperate with the independent medical
performance

of

examination ordered by the Court.

the

independent

medical

Thereafter, on or about

July 3, 1989, counsel for Appellant Zuehlke filed a motion for
sanctions and protective order and a memorandum supporting such,
seeking, among other things, that Respondent Gee's complaint be
dismissed for failure to comply with the order for examination.
After Respondent Gee filed a memorandum in opposition to the
motion

for

sanctions

and

protective

order,

an

evidentiary

hearing was held on such motion on July 14, 1989.

The court

heard testimony from Dr. Lincoln Clark and Respondent Gee, and
entered, later that day, an order granting Appellant's motion to
dismiss Respondent's complaint.

On August 14, 1989, Respondent

Gee filed a notice of appeal.

On August 21, 1989, Respondent

Gee filed a motion to set aside dismissal, pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
the

trial

dismissal.

court

denied

Respondent's

On October 4, 1989,

motion

to

set

aside

That decision was not appealed by Respondent Gee.

On November 1, 1989, Appellant moved the Utah Supreme Court for
an order for summary disposition, which was denied by the Utah
Supreme Court in its order dated November 20, 1989.

At that

time, the Utah Supreme Court set January 2, 1990 as the due date
for Respondent Gee's brief.

After the case was transferred over

to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition in accordance with
the order of the Utah Supreme Court dated December 15, 1989,
counsel for Respondent Gee moved ex parte for an order allowing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a

on

"Th i i;»

December

Zuehlke•

parte

ai ici w a s i lot objected

»t i ( m

w a s I i 11 "(111

to by Appellant

Respondent Gee's motion for an extension of time w a s

granted,
brief.

2 6 , 1 9 89,

IIK

which

gai 'i» liei

mil i II Kebruarj

"', m\H\

"l er

In file

O n January 3 0 , 1990, Respondent G e e once again moved
, ,

f n i ii iiinill n ii I! i

" ' -»•• g e m e n t

This second motion for ^

"'

Appellant's

<)n February 2 2 , 1 9 9 0 ,

:

motion

for

J i j i i y e i N<*qn<i I W \ ) t \ r l f ,

second

specifically noting that t h e reasons
f

. ime w a s objected to b y
**

t h e Utal l Cc " L : I :: f fi ppe*

denied

* i IIIIIP I n (" i 1 n h e r h i ir-,-f.

extension

Appellant Zuehlke on February

,r

>

30-day

extension,

•• Respondent Gee * counsel
;-

M.:i-

Appellant Zuehlke submitted

motion to strike t i * brief O-F

Respondent Gee and a motion •

dismiss the appeal un m e Ddsis

that since the Court had denied Respondent Gee's second request
for

extension

>f ti me,

Respondent Gee's brief served upon

App«
stricken

further

. . iccordance with the Rules of this Court,

Appellant Zuehlke submitted
t *

„J,II

order dismissing the appeal
M »iii I i 1 ecj.

-

w a s denied

* ionorable Regnal

March

'*-

November

t
Procedure

arff

That

in< r.

i.n his order dated

;he matter being before
11 i i Ii Nil I i"s I ml Appe I idte

zu*>

it v

i.-*

\ppeals o r d e r e d t h a t

granting defendant s motion

"the o r d e r

sn, .- i«, reversed ,

This decision w a s issued without opinion.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

ARGUMENT
Appellant Zuehlke petitions the Utah Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari to review various errors the Utah Court of
Appeals made

in reversing the trial court's order granting

Appellant Zuehlke's motion to dismiss.
has

indicated

in

Rule

46

of

the

The Utah Supreme Court

Utah

Rules

of Appellate

Procedure that a writ of certiorari will be granted only for
special and important reasons.

Utah R. App. P. 46.

Some of the

reasons that indicate the character of reasons that will be
considered by the Utah Supreme Court in reviewing a writ of
certiorari are listed in Rule 46 and are set forth above in the
section entitled "Controlling Provisions" of this brief.
In
Appellant

reversing

Zuehlke's

Appeals, in effect:

the

motion

trial
to

court's

dismiss, the

order
Utah

granting
Court

of

rendered a decision that is in conflict

with other decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah
Supreme Court; departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings

so as to call for an exercise of the

Supreme Court's power of supervision; and decided an important
question of state law which has not yet been, but should bef
settled by the Supreme Court.

These errors made by the Utah

Court of Appeals are discussed below in separate points.
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S ORIGINAL APPEAL SHOULD HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION DUE
TO DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF APPEAL.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

dismissing

111 d I ni

i

ni mi ni !

Respondent

11 I

i\ p | M \ i I s

Gees

i • i >inm i t L e d

original

appeal

e r v 111

for

lack

jurisdiction due to Respondent Gee's defective notice
The

d p p l it'dlih"1

I «n,i

ill

I h i . i | IL i i n l

Iiy

* appeal.

Hu.le

U t a h Rules of Appellate Procedure; i

states that '

taking t h e appeal shall give notice

:.ne tiling of a notice ui

appeal

ir»a * copy

b y servi ng p e r s o n a l ! y

o r mo

;iv ;o *\

thereof t-n

counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order
:

in

•

in •

Turning to t h e facts of t h e case at b a r , Judge Moffat
entered h ; •-• order granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion
o
.
<
II 98 ft ppel ] c

> dismiss
-!h I k .e

received

Appeal

a n unsigned,

undated

Notice

of

Intent

(attached as A p p e n d i x B ) , w h i c h w a s n o t t h e actual notice of
appeal

filed with

Th .i s siotice o f Intent to

I In* t final court.

A p p e a l w a s Appellant Zuehlke's only notice from Respondent G e e ;
and

Appellant

Zuehlke

w a s unaware

that

Respondent

G e e hi

actually fIled a Notice o* Appeal w i t h t h e trial court until
A p p e l l a n t Zuehlke received a copy of Respondent Gee's Docketing
S *\ ^m^i

•

A
recognized

,

Notice
I

I in "I utIPi

.

.ntent

Appeal

the Utah Rules

informed

t h e Appellant

Zuehlke

appeal s o m e t i m e , b u t d i d
notice of 1:1 le Noti np

i s n o t authorized o r

- Appellate Procedure

,•<• ,

incline h

"}l\ , ! H\tH

that

:>y i I «s v e r y
Respondent

iidl ur'f1,,

An
only

intended to

place Appellant Zuehlke o n actual

\ppeal.
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Of particular concern is the fact that the notice
contained in the record of the trial court, found at page 438,
indicates that a Notice of Appeal was filed with the court.

The

notice is accompanied by a mailing certificate wherein counsel
for Respondent Gee indicates that he caused a "true and correct
copy of the foregoing Notice of Intent to Appeal to be mailed."
A review of Appendix B, which is the actual Notice received by
Appellant Zuehlke, indicates that, in spite of Respondent Gee's
counsel's representation to the contrary, a true and exact copy
was not mailed.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue regarding the failure of a party to notify the opposing
party of notice of appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals has dealt
specifically with that issue in the case of Thornton v. Slack,
719 P.2d 66 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).

Based upon the Oregon Rules,

which appear to be similar to Rule 3(e) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Court held that the failure to serve
actual notice on all parties who have appeared in the action was
jurisdictional, thus requiring a dismissal of the appeal.

Id.

at 67.
There is no dispute that the only indication of the
appeal received by Appellant Zuehlke was an unsigned, undated
Notice of Intent to Appeal, which was not the actual notice
filed with the court.
of

Appeals

should

Under these circumstances, the Utah Court

have dismissed

appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Respondent

original

By reversing the trial court's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Gee's

nnit'i

I in 1 III a h i ' o u r l

q t * a n l iiii<| il i sin i ss»<i I

rendered

I AppedIs

ill

ellert,

i e c i s i o n t h a t was in c o n f l i c t with Rule 3(e) of the

Utah Rules

Appellate Procedure,

However, even assuming t h a t

t -

li 11 li I lli iy

ni i in t lii i s retjcinil

did, the issue as to whether the failure of a party to notify an
opposing party of notice of appeal requires the dismissal of the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction i s ai i important question of
state law which has not been, but should be, settled by the
Supreme Cou rl

.1 \\ ""i ord 1 nig 1 y

t In 11> Court: shou I d qi."*ii"il Appe II I «"iiiit

Z u e h l k e ' s p e t i t i o n for r e v i e w b y a w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i .
POINT II
RESPONDENT GEE'S ORIGINAL APPEAL SHOULD HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE BRIEF FILED BY
RESPONDENT GEE ON MARCH 1 WAS UNTIMELY AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRICKEN DUE TO THE FACT
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED RESPONDENT
GEE'S SECOND REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF
TIME.
The Cour^

Appea]r

- :

failing

t

dismiss

Respondent Gee's
Respondent Gee o
stricken
of

I lliH

itimely and should have been

The applicable law on this point is found ID Rule 26

III1 1) II ni It mini II i • K

nil

AppH

I i l l r«

t. l i c i t

mi11 ! 1'

| i n u v I <1HK „

MI per!

part:
(a) Time for serving and filing briefs. The
appellant shall serve and file a brief
within 40 days after date of notice from the
clerk of the appellate court pursuant to
Rule 13
By stipulation filed with
the court, the parties may extend each of
such periods for no more than 30 days in
civil cases
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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iinenl

(c) Consequence of failure to file briefs.
If an appellant fails to file a brief within
the time provided in this rule, or within
the time as may be extended by order of the
appellate court, an appellee may move for
dismissal of the appeal.
Utah R. App. P. 26.
Turning to the facts of this case, the Utah Rules of
Appellate

Procedure,

particularly

Rule

26,

require

that

Respondent Gee's brief to the Court of Appeals be filed within
the time allotted by the Rules or such other further time as the
court may allow.

See, Id.

As indicated in the Statement of

Facts above, the Utah Court of Appeals denied Respondent Gee's
second motion for an extension of time; accordingly, the brief
filed by the Respondent Gee on March 2 was untimely and should
have been stricken.

Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals' decision

to reverse the trial court was, in effect, in conflict with Rule
26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Because

Respondent

Gee's

brief

should

have

been

stricken, and because Rule 26(c) provides that if an appellant
fails to file a brief within the time provided in this Rule, or
within the time as may be extended by order of the appellate
court, an appellee may move for dismissal of the appeal, and
because Appellant Zuehlke did move the Court of Appeals for
dismissal of the appeal, the Court of Appeals erred by failing
to grant such dismissal.

Filing a late brief, in accordance

with Rule 26, has the same effect as if the appellant had filed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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n

"Win "Hi

-. - «

dismissed b y operation

*

Thus,

the Utah Court of Appeals erred

indicated above,

\ r • a t o dismiss Respondent

fa

Gee • s ori gi i la J appea„

hi H I 11 I I IN •

-

•

I he I awb

of this state and i s so far a departure from the accepted and
usual course 01 judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision

Accordingly, this

Court should grant Appellant Zuehlke F petition for review by a
w
POINT III
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY FAILING
T O D I S M I S S F O R LACK OF J U R I S D I C T I O N
RESPONDENT GEE'S ORIGINAL APPEAL OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF RESPONDENT GEE'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT.
Because the order of reversal
Appeals

was issued

*

whether or n.-t t. u\
Defendant • s
Respondent

Gee' K

Rule 60(b)

•. >
motion

« unclear as

.he trial court

^

order granting

i ::)] : t:l : .€ •

to set as: *

the Utah Rules of Civi

w

*

t- «T\ opinion,

reversed

" i

**• the Utah Court ui

i -•-

*-* asmissa
Procedure.

•

r <>*

ie •

"i i

reverse the t r i a l court

denial of Respondent Gee's motion

s e t aside the dismissal under Rule 60(t
o r d e r cji"cini i nc] A p p e l l f i n t

* *,

'Ziiclli I llu' "' "i mot

court's
-

m n t I I I!

of t h i s brief i s devoted to the argument that the Utah Court of
Appeals

erred

in

reversing

the

trial

court's
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denial

Respondent Gee's motion to set aside dismissal, assuming such
was the basis of their reversal.
As has been previously indicated, the only Notice of
Appeal

which

appears

in

the

court

record

is

that

notice

appearing at page 438 of the record, dated August 14, 1989. The
trial

court

below

denied

Appellant's

Motion

Dismissal by its order dated October 4, 1989.

to

Set

Aside

(Record 462.)

After that denial, there is no notice of appeal or further
indication of any intent to appeal the decision of the trial
court denying relief under Rule 60(b).
This Court has previously dealt with the very issue of
the appeal of orders entered pursuant to Rule 60(b).

In the

case of Baker v. Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct.App.
1988),

the Utah

Court

of Appeals

dealt with the issue of

Rule 60(b) motions pending while the appellant simultaneously
appealed the trial court's decision.

The Baker court held that

trial courts have jurisdiction to hear Rule 60(b) motions while
an appeal is pending; the court specifically held that denial of
Rule 60(b) relief constitutes a final order and that if that
Rule 60(b) relief is denied, then the parties may appeal the
Rule 60(b) relief sought.
Specifically in regards to this issue, the Utah Court
of Appeals stated in Baker:
We hold that if the district court finds the
motion to be without merit, it may enter an
order denying the motion, and the parties
may appeal from that order.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Baker, 757 P.2d at 880.
The Utah Court of Appeals has also dealt with this
issue in the case of Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d
950

(Utah Ct.App. 1989).

In the Amica case, the appellant

appealed certain rulings of the trial court and then proceeded
with a Rule 60(b) motion.

The Court of Appeals specifically

indicated that Schettler did not appeal the trial court's denial
of his Rule 60(b) motion in a separate notice of appeal.
968.

Id. at

The Court went on to indicate:
Finally we hold that the trial court's order
of June 24, 1987, denying Schettler's 60(b)
motion was a final appealable order, and
since Schettler has not timely appealed that
order, we need not address whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for relief from final judgment.

Id.
The same circumstances exist in this case as did in
the Amica case, supra, in that Respondent Gee's only indication
of an intent to appeal was a notice to appeal the dismissal of
the

initial

dismiss.
the

order

granting

Appellant

Zuehlke's

motion

to

There was no timely notice of appeal filed regarding

trial

court's

denial

of

Respondent

Gee's

attempted

Rule 60(b) relief, and therefore, (as was the case in Arnica),
since the Rule 60(b) motion denial was not appealed, the Utah
Court of Appeals
Such error

erred in addressing this issue on appeal.

is in conflict with Utah law and warrants this

Court's power of supervision.

Accordingly, this Court should
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grant Appellant Zuehlke's petition for review by a writ of
certiorari.
POINT IV
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT
ZUEHLKE'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WAS JUSTIFIED AND WELL
WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY
POWERS.
Assuming the Court of Appeals' reversal was a reversal
of the trial court's order granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion
to dismiss, the Court of Appeals erred in doing such because the
trial

court

motion.

did

not abuse its discretion

in granting that

This is more fully discussed in the sub-points below.
A.

The evidentiary hearing and personal contact with

the parties gave Judge Moffat insight into these issues that
the Utah Court of Appeals could not obtain on appeal.
considering

the

trial

court's

actions

In

regarding

Respondent Gee's conduct at the independent medical examination
performed by Dr. Clark, it was important for the Utah Court of
Appeals

to

note

the

order which

attendance at that examination.
Gee

to

appear

at

the

required

Respondent

Gee's

The order required Respondent

independent

medical

examination

in

accordance with the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and goes on to state, "failure to so appear will
result in sanctions to the plaintiff, Nancy Gee, which may
include dismissal of her action."

Based upon the language of

the order, Respondent Gee was placed on notice that if she did
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not comply with the provisions of Rule 35, sanctions would be
imposed which might include exactly what did happen.

Further,

the order is important in that the order stands as a basis for
the court's dismissal of her action in conjunction with Rule 37
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is further important for the Utah Court of Appeals
to keep in mind that Appellant Zuehlke's Motion to Dismiss was
granted after an evidentiary hearing was held on the matter.

In

that hearing, the trial court had an opportunity to determine
the

demeanor

of

the

witnesses,

the

attitude

with

which

Respondent Gee approached this problem, the truthfulness of her
testimony,

and

all

determination

as

those
to

other

whether

appropriate.

Judge Moffat

testimony

Dr.

of

Respondent Gee.

Clark

or

had

and

components
not

that

sanctions

an opportunity
the

go

into a

would

be

to hear the

responsive

testimony

of

It was only after hearing that testimony that

Judge Moffat arrived at his decision to dismiss the Respondent
Gee's action for her failure to comply with the court's order.
Under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judge

Moffat

is

given

discretion

violations of discovery orders.

to

impose

sanctions

for

The discretion is given to the

trial court presumably due to the judge's ability to monitor the
case, deal with the parties, and have personal contact with
those

parties.

An appellate

court

loses

the advantage of

personal contact and is left to make its decisions by looking at
a

record

only.

For

these

reasons, appellate
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courts

have

recognized that a trial court's discretion will be overturned
only if there is clear reason to do so.

G.M. Leasing Corp. v.

Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975).
The Utah Court of Appeals' attention was directed to
the exhibit submitted as part of Dr. Clark's testimony.
exhibit

has

been

"Appendix C."
notes

taken

described
exhibit

is

to

this

brief

and

is

marked

This exhibit is a typewritten version of the
by

in

attached

This

Dr.

his

Clark

testimony

during

the

examination.

(see Transcript, page

As

he

4 ) , this

a detailed version of what occurred during the

examination.

According to the exhibit, Respondent Gee failed to

respond to virtually every question she was asked and in many
cases not only refused to provide the information, but defied
Dr. Clark's attempts to obtain it. A close review of Respondent
Gee's testimony will indicate that she does not deny her failure
to provide information, but rather she centers on the fact that
she was present in Dr. Clark's office for a specific period
time, as well as other matters which are irrelevant to whether
or not she complied with the court's order to submit herself for
an examination.

Certainly, the facts indicate that Respondent

Gee ignored the court's order, justifying the acts of the trial
court.
B.

The requisite "intent" to justify the imposition

of sanctions was determined by Judge Moffat and supported by the
record.
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In her brief to the Court of Appeals, Respondent Gee
argued

that

questions.

there

was

no

"intent"

to

avoid

the

doctor's

A review of Dr. Clark's testimony and notes leads to

the only possible conclusion that Respondent Gee intentionally
withheld information and refused to cooperate with Dr. Clark.
Respondent Gee obviously went to the examination with the intent
not to provide Dr. Clark the information and thereafter set
about to carry out her intent.
As Respondent Gee correctly pointed out in her brief
to the Utah Court of Appeals, the decision regarding sanctions
entered is a discretionary one with the trial court.

The most

recent case dealing with the discretionary powers given the
trial court in conjunction with the dismissal of actions as a
sanction under Rule 37 is Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

In Arnica, a default judgment was

entered against a defendant for failure to produce personal tax
returns, among other things.

The Arnica court noted that "the

imposition of sanctions is within the sound discretion of the
trial

court

discretion."

and will

be

disturbed

absent

an abuse of

Id.

The
necessary

not

that

Arnica
the

court

further

stated

that

trial court make a specific

it

is

not

finding of

willfulness, bad faith or fault if a full understanding of the
issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined by the appellate
court.

Id. at 962.

It is the position of Appellant Zuehlke
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that a specific finding of fault was entered by the trial court,
but if not, the record herein certainly supports such a finding.
Appellant Zuehlke concedes that mere oversight or a
non-willful violation of an order is not a sufficient basis to
allow imposition of sanctions.

However, in this case, while

Judge Moffat did not use the word "willful," he did rule that
Respondent

Gee

unreasonably

failed

to respond

to

questions

posed to her by Dr. Lincoln Clark, thus expressly indicating
fault.

(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Finding of

Fact No. 2, Record 429.)

Further, in the Minute Entry entered

by the trial court after the hearing on July 14, 1989, Judge
Moffat states, "It is perfectly apparent to the court that the
defendant (sic) refused to cooperate in the ordered examination
of her by Dr. Clark." (Record 425).
fact, as well

The specific findings of

as the language of Judge Moffat's decision,

indicate willful conduct or at least fault on the part of the
Respondent

Gee

in

intentionally

and

knowingly

failing

to

cooperate in the conduct of the independent medical examination
which had been ordered to take place in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It

was based upon that refusal of Respondent Gee, which the court
determined

to

be

"unreasonable,"

that

the

court

granted

Appellant Zuehlke's Motion to Dismiss.
In the case of First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v.
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The general rule is that a party in a civil
case who refuses to respond to an order
compelling discovery is subject to sanctions
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
The sanctions are intended to deter
misconduct in connection with discovery,
and require a showing of "willfulness, bad
faith, or fault" on the part of the noncomplying party. The choice of appropriate
discovery
sanction
is primarily the
responsibility of the trial judge and will
not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion.
Id. at 1266 (citations omitted).
The record in this case reveals more than sufficient
information to demonstrate a willful intent of Respondent Gee's
refusal to provide information and at a minimum, creates fault
on her part.

The failure to provide answers was not due to her

lack of ability to give them, nor a lack of knowledge on her
part.

The answers were not given simply because Respondent Gee,

for whatever reason, opted not to give those answers, which was
in direct violation of the court's order.

Judge Moffat had

every opportunity to consider her testimony, to listen to her
explanations,

as

well

as

to

listen

to

the

testimony

of

Dr. Clark.

After doing so, Judge Moffat concluded that the

appropriate

sanction would be dismissal of Respondent Gee's

case, which is within his discretionary power.
C.

Judge

Moffat

did

not

abuse

his

discretion

in

dismissing Respondent Gee's action.
The true issue in this point, therefore, is whether
the Utah Court of Appeals erred in holding, in effect, that
Judge Moffat abused his discretion in granting the Motion to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Dismiss of Appellant Zuehlke.

In the case of G.M. Leasing

Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1975),

the

Utah

Supreme

Court, in attempting

to

determine

whether an abuse of discretion had taken place in that case,
indicated that:
. . . we should not undertake to substitute
our idea of what is proper for that of the
trial court.
The law is stated in 5
Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, as follows:
Decisions reached in the
proper exercise of such discretion
have frequently been said not to be
within the proper scope of appellate
review, and it is clearly the
ordinary practice of the appellate
courts to refuse to review the
exercise of such discretion except
for abuse.
*

*

*

*

*

*

[A]
discretionary
determination may be "reviewed" only
in the case of "gross," "clear,"
"plain," "palpable," or "manifest"
abuse of discretion . . . .
Id. at 1245.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the
finding on the part of Judge Moffat that there was no abuse of
discretion

in deciding

imposing them.

on the sanctions to be imposed and

As demonstrated by the record, Respondent Gee

knowingly and unreasonably opted not to cooperate with Dr. Clark
and, in doing so, suffered the very sort of sanction that the
court warned her of in the order that required her appearance.
There is no evidence that Respondent Gee was unable to conform
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the court's order, unlike many of the cases dealing with this
subject.

Respondent Gee simply chose not to cooperate with

Dr. Clark.
The Utah Court of Appeals, by reversing the trial
court's order granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion to dismiss, in
effect, decided that the trial judge abused his discretion in
granting such motion to dismiss.

Since the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in granting Appellant Zuehlke's motion to
dismiss, the Utah Court of Appeals erred in reversing such
order.

Such error was in conflict with prior decisions of this

Court and the Utah Court of Appeals and is a departure from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings so as to call
for

an

exercise

Accordingly,

this

of

this

Court

Court's

should

power

grant

of

supervision.

Appellant

Zuehlke's

petition for review by a writ of certiorari.
CONCLUSION
Based on the authorities and discussion above, this
Court should grant a writ of certiorari for the purposes of
reviewing the errors made by the Utah Court of Appeals in
reversing the trial court's order granting Appellant Zuehlke's
motion to dismiss.
DATED this <*?/

day of December, 1990.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

EKD:lri

TERRY -#7 PLANT
ERIK K. DAVENPORT
Attorney
forSchool,
Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Nancy Gee,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

ORDER OF REVERSAL
Case No. 890718-CA

Angela M. Zuehlke
Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme (On Rule 31 Hearing).
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the order granting defendant's
motion to dismiss is reversed and the case is remanded for
trial or such other proceedings as the court deems appropriate,
DATED this 21st day of November, 1990.
ALL CONCUR:

Norman H. Jacksonfjudge

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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HANSON EPPERSON & SMITH

James C. Haskins (1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: 268-3994*
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

NANCY GEE,
Plaintiff, '
NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL

vs.
File No.
Civil No. C85-4553
Judge RICHARD H. MOFFAT

ANGELA M. ZUEHLKE,

Defendant.
Plaintiffs/Appellants

in the above-entitled matter

hereby

appeal from the provisions of the Order to dismiss entered by the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County County,
State of Utah, on the 14th day of July, 1989, wherein the Court
granted

the motion of defendant

to dismiss

District

proceedings in this matter.

DATED this

ft

day of

, 1988.

JAMES C. HASKINS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Notice of Intent to Appeal to be mailed, postage
prepaid, to. Terry M. Plant, HANSEN, EPPERSON & SMITH,

attorneys

for Defendant, 4 Triad Center, Suite 500 j P.O. Box 2970
Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 this
1988.

|j J*

day

of

!
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July 11,

1989

UNIVERSITY
opUTAH

Summary of Attempted IME with Ms. Nancy Gee
The IME with Ms. Gee was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on 6/29/89. She
arrived on that date at my office at the University of Utah
Medical Center at about 2:20 p.m.
At the beginning of the interview she informed me that the
time available was limited by the fact that she had to be at home
by 4:00 p.m. She then remarked that she was "legally advised not
A to say anything about the law suit".
She then said, "You will
receive a subpoena from me that will hold you for four days".
"You are going to be a witness for me".
In response to a
request to clarify the above statements she implied that it was
her intent to subpoena me for four days at the time of the trial
on her case and to hold me for a period of four days as a
witness. Further efforts were made to clarify the conditions she
was placing upon the examination.
I then asked her what she
meant by not talking about the law suit and she responded, "I
don't know",
I then asked "What can we talk about in this
interview?"
She again responded, "I don't know".
I then
suggested further areas which she might contribute information
about. This included a question about how she had been, what her
condition had been like since I last saw her, and her response
3^ was "Subpoena it". I then asked if there had been any further
testing done on her psychological status and she responded,
^) "Don't know, you will have to ask the doctors". When asked
what her current day to day activities were, having in mind
school or employment, she responded, "You can find out first of
*) next week". She then added, "If you want to know what
is going
on, you will have to find it out from my doctors". I then asked
her what her present difficulties were in her current life
situation and her response was, "Your opinions are not time
5) limited, therefore, there is no point in the examination". When
asked if she still had any difficulties relating to the accident
(\ she responded, "You will have to talk to my doctors about that".
When asked, "Who are your doctors?", she responded "David
Nielson, Page Heineman, and Milton Thomas".
She added that Dr.
Nielson had put her to work in his office to pay for her therapy
and that she is in a head injury group of Page Heineman.
I then
asked
"Do
you
feel
you
are
getting
better"?
She
responded,
^
"You'ii have to talk to the doctors". She then made a series of
remarks in a somewhat hostile
vaguely threatening vein, as
follows: "I wanted to be an attorney since childhood.
I have
expert opinions on childhood.
I know more about you than you
have c~ me. I have 2 1/2 boxes on you.
Every defense and
plain
^f's attorney in town has a book on you. There is a book
floats .± around in the legal world about you".

Department of Psychiatry
School of Medicine
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
LawMedical
Library, Drive
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
50 .North
Machine-generated
OCR,Utah
may contain
Salt Lake City.
M l 3 2 errors.

-2In reference to my previous IME with her in May 1986 during
which she claimed to have no memory for two years before and six
months after the accident, I asked, "Have you recovered any
memories from the period before the accident, have they come
back"? Her answer was "You'll have to ask the doctors".
She then stated that she will only talk to me about what is
"public knowledge". "I will not talk to you about me or my
family or the accident".
She then demanded, "Can you cure head
injury? I know I have had injury". She then added that she had
to learn psychiatry and psychology and by inference this was in
order to pursue her case. She then added she would not complete
the evaluation. I asked her why she was not using an attorney to
assist her with her case and she responded, "I know that is why
you wanted to see me to find out my strategy", and refused to
answer the question further. She added, "I am here because I am
ordered. You can look at me, the Court has ordered me to appear,
has not ordered me to speak, just to appear".
She then angrily
remarked that I had spent only ten minutes with her at her
previous IME. I responded that this was not correct and my
records indicated otherwise. She then commented, "You can't say
that my mother is a liar". At another point she added that an
attorney had told her that she didn't have to talk to me but
would not give me the name of the attorney when asked saying,
"That is privileged information and furthermore my attorneys
change from day to day". She then added, "You can find out from
Hansen, Epperson, and Smith".
She then added, "I can't talk
about my case because I am doing it, I'm the lawyer".
At about 3:00 p.m. deciding that further efforts were futile,
I indicated that we had best terminate the interview. At that
point she busied herself re-moving some documents from her
briefcase, pointing out that the reason she was late was that she
had been down to the Court to obtain a subpoena oh me.
She then
busied herself writing on the back of the copies of the subpoena
some statements that she would not permit me to look at or would
not indicate what she was writing.
I presume that it was a
statement that she was officially serving the subpoena upon me
because she added that I could expect the subpoena to be served
more officially in due course.
Her attitude throughout the
interview was expressive of anger.
She was vaguely threatening
and at various points grandiose in her view of her control of the
situation. My sense of futility in my efforts to engage her in a
meaningful exchange of information had no impact upon her.
Sincerely,
Lincoln D. Clark, M.D.
Professor of Psychiatry
Adjunct Professor of Pharmacology
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NANCY GEE,

]|
FINDINGS OF FACT,
|
CONCLUSIONS OF LAN,
]|
AND ORDER GRANTING
}
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
|
TO DISMISS
|
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
]
I
Civil No. C85-4553
1 Judge Richard H. Moffat

Plaintiff,

v.
ANGELA M. ZUEHLKE,
Defendant.
The

Court

having

reviewed

and

considered

the

defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's case for her failure
to

cooperate

and

comply

with

the

Court's

Order

Granting

V

Defendant's Motion for Further Medical Evaluation dated June 27,
1989,

and

defendant

having
and

reviewed

the

the plaintiff,

memoranda

as well

submitted

by

the

as an affidavit and

supplemental affidavit of the plaintiff and the affidavit of
Dr. Lincoln Clark.

Further, the Court, having considered the

testimony of Dr. Lincoln Clark, as well as the testimony of the
plaintiff, Nancy Gee, at the hearing held on July 14, 1989,
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Court ordered the plaintiff, Nancy Gee,

to appear at the office of Dr. Lincoln Clark for purposes of an
independent medical examination on June 29, 1989, in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2.
to

respond

That the plaintiff, Nancy Gee, unreasonably failed
to

questions

posed

by

Dr.

Lincoln

Clark

and

otherwise failed to provide information necessary for Dr. Clark
to complete his independent medical examination, thus rendering
the examination meaningless.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAN
1.
questions

That Nancy Gee's failure to properly respond to

posed

to

her

by

Dr.

Lincoln

Clark

and

provide

information to Dr. Clark, who was acting as an independent
medical examiner in accordance with Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, constitutes a violation of this Court's Order
dated June 27, 1989 and of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2.

That as a result of the failure of Plaintiff Gee

to properly comply with this Court's Order, as well as the
general provisions of Rule 35, it is appropriate that sanctions
be entered as allowed for under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

-2-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

That as an appropriate sanction in accordance with

this Court's Order of June 27, 1989, as well as Rule 37 of the
Utah Rules

of

Civil Procedure, it is appropriate that the

plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, as a result of Plaintiff's
failure to cooperate and failure to comply with the Court's
Order dated June 27, 1989, all claims against the defendant,
Angela Zuehlke, and by the plaintiff, Nancy Gee, be dismissed
with prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this

/y day of July, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT,
postage prepaid, this

/y

day of July, 1989, to the following:

Nancy Gee
1709 East Creek Road
Sandy, Utah 84092

TMP:lrj
85-487.1
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?B 2 ' 1990

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00
\

Nancy Gee,

\

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No, 890Z18-CA

v.
Angela M. Zuehlke,
Defendant and Respondent

This matter is before the Court upon appellant's motion for
an extension of time to file appellant's brief, filed 2
February 1990.
On 28 December 1989, the Court granted appellant's initial
30 day extension request. Appellant now seeks a second 30 day
extension, to 2 March 1990, to file the brief because counsel
"has been involved in trials and hearings" and has not had the
opportunity to complete the brief.
Pursuant to the Court's internal procedure governing
extension requests, a second extension is granted upon a
showing of cause. Extensions "for cause" are granted for
reason of emergency or unanticipated circumstances. Workload
and/or other commitments are not sufficient grounds for a
v
second extension.
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is
denied. , ^ *\
Dated this '^sA—

day of February 1990.

BY THE COURTS:

Judcj^ Reg n a U W

(
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